Manual Review

A thorough line-by-line review was conducted on the codebase to identify potential malfunctions and vulnerabilities in Euler Finance's Chainlink support integration.

As the project at hand implements oracle-interfacing price deduction code, intricate care was put into ensuring that the flow of information within the system conforms to the specifications and restrictions laid forth within the protocol's specification.

We validated that all state transitions of the system occur within sane criteria and that all rudimentary formulas within the system execute as expected. We pinpointed a relatively insecure Chainlink integration within the system which could have had moderate to severe ramifications to its overall operation, however, it was conveyed ahead of time to the Euler Finance team to be promptly remediated.

Additionally, the system was investigated for any other commonly present attack vectors such as re-entrancy attacks, mathematical truncations, logical flaws and ERC / EIP standard inconsistencies. The documentation of the project was adequate to an extent, however, we advise the Euler Finance team to enhance their in-line documentation across the board as it is relatively lackluster.

A total of 6 findings were identified over the course of the manual review of which 5 findings concerned the behaviour and security of the system. The non-security related findings, such as optimizations, are included in the separate Code Style chapter.

The finding table below enumerates all these security / behavioural findings:

ID	Severity	Addressed	Title
GOV-01M			Inexistent Sanitization of Pricing Type
GOV-02M			Manual Assignment of Chainlink Aggregators
GOV-03M			Inexistent Guarantee of Smooth Oracle Transition
RMR-01M			Inexplicable Upper Price Enforcement
RMR-02M			Improper Integration of Chainlink Oracles