RebaseEngine Manual Review Findings

REE-01M: Incorrect Execution Path

Description:

The _rebasePool function does not perform any restriction on when a rebase is called, permitting it to be invoked after the program duration has ended and thus causing an incorrect amount of dDAFI distributed to be reported.

Example:

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56// It calcultes the rewards already distributed(claimed + unclaimed) since the start of staking program
57uint dDAFIDistributed = (MAX_DAFI * (block.timestamp - database.getStakingStartTime())) / database.getProgramDuration();

Recommendation:

We advise a proper if statement to be introduced to handle this particular case and ensure the total distribution is properly measured.

Alleviation:

A proper if-else clause was introduced at the beginning of the function evaluating the correct maxTimeStampForCalc.

REE-02M: Incorrect Initializer Pattern

Description:

The initialize function does not perform any access control on repetitive invocations, allowing it to initialize the contract an arbitrary amount of times.

Example:

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21function initialize(INetworkDemand _networkDemand, StakingDatabase _database) external onlyOwner{
22    networkDemand = _networkDemand;
23    database = _database;
24}

Recommendation:

We advise a proper require check to be introduced that ensures networkDemand and database have not already been set.

Alleviation:

A contract-level INITIALIZED flag was set that is evaluated during the initialize function and ensures it can be invoked only once.

REE-03M: Inexistent Reversal of Authority

Description:

The addWhitelist function is a one-way function to render a designated party responsible for updating the pool and per-user stake network demand tickers.

Example:

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101function addWhitelist(address account) external onlyOwner {
102    require(account != address(0));
103    whitelists[account] = true;
104}

Recommendation:

We advise the system to be slightly restructured by introducing a method to remove individuals from the whitelist. This would potentially allow the owner of the contract to "race" a malicious transaction and salvage the action of a misbehaving whitelisted member.

Alleviation:

A removeWhitelist function was introduced with an onlyOwner modifier thus alleviating this exhibit.