Omniscia Tesseract Audit

TesseractVaultDeployer Manual Review Findings

TesseractVaultDeployer Manual Review Findings

TVD-01M: Inexistent Control Variable of Fees

Description:

The deployment of a vault via the TesseractVaultDeployer may involve performance and management fees to be imposed on it. These fees are configured by the owner of the TesseractVaultDeployer, meaning that they may change between a vault deployment transaction's submission to the network and its execution.

Impact:

A user may deploy a vault with a significant initialDeposit believing the management / performance fee to be low only for it to be changed before their transaction's execution and increased unfairly.

Example:

contracts/TesseractVaultDeployer.sol
237function _deployVault(uint256 initialDeposit)
238    internal
239    returns (FusionFactoryLogicLib.FusionInstance memory fusionInstance)
240{
241    if (initialDeposit < minInitialDeposit) revert InsufficientInitialDeposit();
242

243    // Step 1: Clone vault with deployer as temporary owner
244    fusionInstance = FUSION_FACTORY.clone(
245        assetName,
246        assetSymbol,
247        UNDERLYING_TOKEN,
248        REDEMPTION_DELAY_IN_SECONDS,
249        address(this),
250        daoFeePackageIndex
251    );
252

253    IporFusionAccessManager accessManager = IporFusionAccessManager(fusionInstance.accessManager);
254

255    // Step 2: Grant OWNER-managed roles
256    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.GUARDIAN_ROLE, guardian, 0);
257

258    // Step 3: Grant temporary ATOMIST_ROLE to deployer
259    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.ATOMIST_ROLE, address(this), 0);
260

261    // Step 4: Grant ATOMIST-managed roles
262    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.ALPHA_ROLE, alpha, 0);
263    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.WHITELIST_ROLE, msg.sender, 0);
264    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.WHITELIST_ROLE, address(this), 0);
265    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.FUSE_MANAGER_ROLE, atomist, 0);
266    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.FUSE_MANAGER_ROLE, fuseManager, 0);
267    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.CONFIG_INSTANT_WITHDRAWAL_FUSES_ROLE, alpha, 0);
268    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.CLAIM_REWARDS_ROLE, tesseractRewardsManager, 0);
269    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.TRANSFER_REWARDS_ROLE, tesseractRewardsManager, 0);
270    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.UPDATE_REWARDS_BALANCE_ROLE, tesseractRewardsManager, 0);
271

272    // Step 5: Grant real ATOMIST_ROLE
273    accessManager.grantRole(Roles.ATOMIST_ROLE, atomist, 0);
274

275    // Step 6: Configure fees (skip if both are 0)
276    uint256 perfFee = performanceFee;
277    uint256 mgmtFee = managementFee;
278    if (perfFee > 0 || mgmtFee > 0) {

Recommendation:

We advise control variables to be introduced for vault deployers, permitting them to specify the maximum management / performance fee they are willing to accept for the initialDeposit they have configured, akin to how slippage functions in AMM trades.

Alleviation (fdf0694b5c38834fa5a20cb2765766924d34f5d4):

Proper control variables called maxManagementFee and maxPerformanceFee have been introduced to the TesseractVaultDeployer::_deployVault function and its parent calls that are checked against the current managementFee and performanceFee respectively, alleviating this exhibit in full.

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