Omniscia Steer Protocol Audit
PoolSharkBaseLiquidityManager Code Style Findings
PoolSharkBaseLiquidityManager Code Style Findings
PSB-01C: Incorrect Specification of Gap
| Type | Severity | Location |
|---|---|---|
| Standard Conformity |  | PoolSharkBaseLiquidityManager.sol:L631 |
Description:
The gap variable declared by the PoolSharkBaseLiquidityManager is set as 37 in length when the contract consumes 9 storage slots per its structure.
Example:
contracts/vault-types/PoolSharkLiquidityManagers/PoolSharkBaseLiquidityManager.sol
101/// @dev Address of vault registry102/// Address strategist can collect strategist fees, but is not stored here.103address internal vaultRegistry;104
105/// @notice Addresses of Token0 and Token1106IERC20 public token0;107
108IERC20 public token1;109
110/// @notice Address of PoolShark pool111IRangePool public pool;112
113/// @dev For depositing114/// Roughly corresponds to a 5% diff between current price and twap price115int24 public maxTickChange;116
117/// @dev Number of seconds to get the time-weighted average over118uint32 public twapInterval;119
120//For mint Callback Protection121bool internal mintCallBackProtection;122
123//For swap Callback Protection124bool internal swapCallBackProtection;125
126mapping(string => uint256) public accruedFees0;127
128mapping(string => uint256) public accruedFees1;129
130address internal feeManager;131
132uint256 public totalFees0;133
134uint256 public totalFees1;Recommendation:
We advise the gap to be corrected to 41, properly summing up to 50 slots in total per contract.
Alleviation (6513a21a002d422e298719b22f73a4559dfd4663):
The gap size has been corrected to 41 per our recommendation, addressing this exhibit.
As an answer to a separate concern raised by the Steer Protocol team, we would like to outline that the OpenZeppelin documentation itself advocates for a constructor in upgradeable contracts when they are initializable, and thus is safe to use.