Omniscia Bonq Audit
trove-factory Static Analysis Findings
trove-factory Static Analysis Findings
TRE-01S: Improper Invocations of EIP-20 transfer
/ transferFrom
Type | Severity | Location |
---|---|---|
Standard Conformity | trove-factory.sol:L298, L352, L482, L595 |
Description:
The linked statements do not properly validate the returned bool
values of the EIP-20 standard transfer
& transferFrom
functions. As the standard dictates, callers must not assume that false
is never returned.
Impact:
If the code mandates that the returned bool
is true
, this will cause incompatibility with tokens such as USDT / Tether as no such bool
is returned to be evaluated causing the check to fail at all times. On the other hand, if the token utilized can return a false
value under certain conditions but the code does not validate it, the contract itself can be compromised as having received / sent funds that it never did.
Example:
298require(WETHContract.transfer(_trove, msg.value), "b8282 could not transfer the requested amount");
Recommendation:
Since not all standardized tokens are EIP-20 compliant (such as Tether / USDT), we advise a safe wrapper library to be utilized instead such as SafeERC20
by OpenZeppelin to opportunistically validate the returned bool
only if it exists in each instance.
Alleviation:
The Bonq Protocol team has partially introduced the usage of OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library for transfer
and transferFrom
invocations.