Omniscia Bonq Audit

trove-factory Static Analysis Findings

trove-factory Static Analysis Findings

TRE-01S: Improper Invocations of EIP-20 transfer / transferFrom

Description:

The linked statements do not properly validate the returned bool values of the EIP-20 standard transfer & transferFrom functions. As the standard dictates, callers must not assume that false is never returned.

Impact:

If the code mandates that the returned bool is true, this will cause incompatibility with tokens such as USDT / Tether as no such bool is returned to be evaluated causing the check to fail at all times. On the other hand, if the token utilized can return a false value under certain conditions but the code does not validate it, the contract itself can be compromised as having received / sent funds that it never did.

Example:

contracts/trove-factory.sol
298require(WETHContract.transfer(_trove, msg.value), "b8282 could not transfer the requested amount");

Recommendation:

Since not all standardized tokens are EIP-20 compliant (such as Tether / USDT), we advise a safe wrapper library to be utilized instead such as SafeERC20 by OpenZeppelin to opportunistically validate the returned bool only if it exists in each instance.

Alleviation:

The Bonq Protocol team has partially introduced the usage of OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library for transfer and transferFrom invocations.